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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
“People are the real wealth of a nation and the basic objective of 
development is to create an enabling environment for people to live long 
healthy and creative lives: this may appear to be a simple truth that is 
often forgotten” 
[UNDPHDR, 1990] 
Nothing evokes the misery of mass unemployment more than the 
photographs of the depression. Clearly, you can see it in the dawn faces 
of the men, in their shabby clothes as well as in their eyes. In fact, as 
the world struggles to emerge from the global crises, some two hundred 
million people are unemployed. Yet, jobs are instrumental to achieving 
economic and social development. Beyond their critical importance for 
individual well-being, they lie at the heart of many broader societal 
objectives, such as poverty reduction, economy wide productivity growth 
and social cohesion. Thus, the development pay offs from jobs include 
acquiring skills, empowering women and stabilizing post-conflict 
societies. In otherworld, jobs that contribute to these broader goals are 
valuable not only for those who hold them but for society as a whole. 
That is they are good jobs of development. However, demographic 
shifts, technological progress and the lasting effects of the international 
financial crises are reshaping the employment landscape in countries 
around the world. On one hand, countries that successfully adapt to 
these changes and meet their job challenges can achieve dramatic gains 
in living standards, productivity growth as well as mort cohesive 
societies. On the other hand, those that do not will miss out on the 
transformational effects of economic and social development. Indeed, 
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jobs are transformational and they can transform what we earn, what 
we do, and even who we are. Then, no surprise that jobs are at the top 
of development agenda every where. 
However, it is important to note that some jobs do more for 
development while others may do little (even if they are appealing to 
individuals). Yet, which jobs have the greatest development payoffs 
depends on the prevailing circumstances. Obviously, countries differ in 
their level of development, demography, endowments and institutions. 
Specifically, agrarian societies face the challenge of making agricultural 
jobs more productive and creating job opportunities outside farms. In 
contrast, resource rich countries need to diversify their exports so that 
jobs are connected to global markets rather than supported through 
government transfers. And yet, formalizing countries need to design 
their social protection systems in ways that extend their coverage 
without penalizing employment. Generally, good jobs are those that 
provide greater well-being to the people who hold them. But good jobs 
for development are those with the highest value for society and 
understanding these wider payoffs to jobs has shaped recent 
development thinking. Consequently, spillovers from jobs can be 
identified across all three transformations as shown in figure 1.1 (World 
Bank, 2013). As shown, some directly affect the earnings of other (as 
when a job is supported through government transfers) or restrictive 
regulations that reduce employment opportunities for others. Yet, other 
spillovers take place through interactions or when job allocation 
contributes to common goals (such as poverty reduction, environmental 
protection or fairness). 
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Conventionally, it is ideal to focus on growth as a precondition for 
continued increases in living standards and strengthened social 
cohesion. But lags and gaps among the three transformations of living 
standards, productivity and social cohesion are not uncommon. Thus, 
the impact of growth on poverty reduction varies considerable across 
countries and regions. Yet, in some cases, growth is not accompanied by 
increased social cohesion, even though poverty may fall and living 
standards improve for some, the expectations of others remain 
unfulfilled. Again, the employment intensity of different sectors and 
fairness in access to employment opportunities matter as well. Therefore 
it is job that brings together the three transformations perhaps, trade 
offs among improving living standards, accelerating productivity growth 
and fostering social cohesion reflect a measurement problem that is 
more than a real choice. Clearly, if growth indicators captured the 
intangible social benefits from jobs from lower poverty to greater social 
cohesion) then, a growth strategy and job strategy would be equivalent. 
But a growth strategy may not pay enough attention to female 
employment (or to employment in secondary cities) or to idleness 
among youth. Thus, when potentially important spillovers from jobs are 
not realized, a jobs strategy may provide more useful insights. 
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FIGURE 1.1 TRANSFORMATIONAL JOBS: DEVELOPMENT 
EFFECTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N LIVING 
STANDARDS 
PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL 
COHESION 
1. Jobs for the 
poor 
Jobs in functional 
cities 
Jobs that give 
sense of 
fairness 
2. Jobs that 
empower 
women 
Jobs connected to 
global markets 
Jobs that link 
to networks 
3. Jobs that do not 
shift burden to 
others 
Jobs that are 
environmentally 
benign  
Jobs that 
shape social 
identity 
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Critically, for most Africa households (poor and prosperous alike) income 
from work is the main determinant of their living conditions. Thus, the 
economic objectives of these households are similar. That is, families 
seek to meet their basic needs, improve their standards of living, and 
manage the risks they face in an uncertain world as well as expanding 
opportunities for their children. Yet, the opportunities to achieve these 
objectives through work vary substantially across African regions at 
different stages of development. In other words, households supply 
labor, employer’s demand it and this interaction along with self-
employment and household production yields the employment and wage 
outcomes as observed in any Africa economy. Unfortunately, many 
who want work cannot find it. Indeed, this unemployment takes 
many forms which involve human cost. Yet, the causes of 
unemployment are complex and often and unrelated to the level of 
development. But development does have an important impact on how 
unemployment manifests itself. Notably, African youths encounter 
severe roadblocks. Some go to work too early, others cannot enter the 
work force while others get stuck in low productivity work. In other 
words, poverty and non-inclusive economic growth can exacerbate poor 
youth outcomes such as child labor, school dropout rates and 
joblessness in Africa.  
 Regrettably, almost half of all workers in Africa countries are 
engaged in small – scale farming or self-employment. Typically, there 
are jobs that do not come with a steady paycheck and benefits. Here, 
the problem for most poor people in these countries is not the lack of a 
job or few hours of work. Basically, many hold more than on job and 
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work long hours. Yet, they are not earning enough to secure a 
better future for themselves and their children. At times, they are 
also working in unsafe conditions without basic rights protection.  
Consequently, this paper intends to tackle some of the most pressing 
questions that African policy makers are asking right now: should African 
countries design their development strategies around growth or focus on 
jobs and are their situations where the focus should be on protecting 
jobs rather than protecting workers? The rest of this paper is divided 
into eight sections. Section two examines African growth performances. 
Labor market literature is reviewed in section three. Section four 
presents African job challenges while Driving KICTS (knowledge, 
information and communication technologies) is the theme of section 
five. Innovative institutions are presented in section six while section 
seven discuses the enabling infrastructures. Policy Reforms are 
highlighted in section eight while section nine concludes the paper.  
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2.0 AFFRICA N GROWTH PERFORMANC 
As the sound largest of the earth’s seven continents 
(covering about 30,330,000 SQKM) Africa is very rich in mineral 
resources (possessing must of the known mineral types of the world) 
many of which are found in significant quantities, although with uneven 
geographic distribution. At independence, Africans had high hopes of 
rapid development. In fact, new energies were released by the ending 
colonialism while African leaders were determined that their countries 
would catch up with the developed world. In 1961, overall economic 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.4 percent and the pace 
quickened after 1967. But as the 1970s advanced, countries began to 
stumble and by the 1980s, output was actually dealing (World Bank, 
1989). Excluding oil economies, aggregate annual growth initially rose 
but generally declined in the late 1970s and 1980s. Clearly, these 
variation in country experience reflected the rich diversity in sub- 
Saharan Africa and even within countries, there are often large 
differences during this period, Africa’s generally poor performance were 
reflected in weak growth in the productive sectors, poor export 
performance, mounting debt, deteriorating social conditions, 
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environmental degradation as well as increasing decay of institution 
capacity. 
    During this period and general aggregate economic performance in 
sub-Saharan Africa remained unsatisfactory. Indeed, both Domestic and 
external factors contributed to the disappointing overall performance 
again, the external environment (characterized by sharp declines in 
world commodity prices and substantial losses in the terms of trade) has 
been generally unfavorable. For many countries, the effects of this 
adverse external development were compounded by unfavorable 
weather. Virtually, all countries in the region were confronted with deep- 
rooted developmental constraints (rapid population growth, low human 
capital development and inadequate infrastructure) which constituted 
major impediments to private sector development and the supply 
response of the economies. In addition, ethnic conflicts, political 
instability, adverse security conditions and protracted civil wars 
aggravated the economic performance of several countries. Similarly, 
governance concerns were compounded by the legacy of repressive 
regimes in several countries; by ineffective judicial systems as well as by 
complex administrative (institutional) frameworks. Here, inappropriate 
economic policies also contributed to the observed weak aggregate 
economic performance. 
     Notably, in the period prior to the start of the adjustment programs, 
many countries were experiencing widespread inefficiencies in resource 
use due to import restrictions (import quotas and tariffs). High 
commodity export taxes; administered interest rates and foreign 
exchange controls. Again inappropriate policies which resulted in relative 
price distortions in most of the key sectors adversely affected economic 
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incentives and production. Surely, these price distortions combined with 
the severe external shocks of the 1970s / 80s (declining terms of trade, 
drying up of foreign capital inflows and rising world interest rates) 
weakened many economics of sub- Saharan Africa (Elbadawi, Ghura and 
Uwujaren, 1992; Gura and Hadijimichael, 1996). In other words, 
consequently, the failure of many countries throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s to accommodate the adverse effects of negative external 
shocks compounded the negative impact of these shocks. Clearly, as at 
early 1980s, it became obvious that most of the adverse external shocks 
were of a long term nature and that countries must have to adjust. 
Hence, as at that time, many counties realized the urgent need for 
economic policy reforms to address to their short- term balance of 
payment crises as well as medium to long term productivity 
improvements. Thus, the word bank structural adjustments programs 
were designed to enable countries reform their policies in order to boost 
the structure of incentives and raise the profitability of the various 
sectors without unduly high reductions in consumption per capita during 
the initial stages of the programs. And as at the end of 1989, twenty- 
eight Africa countries had active adjustment programs as well as twenty- 
seven other program (World Bank, 1991- 
      Even though many Africa countries vigorously pushed through their 
adjustment programmer’s economic growth declined from 3.02 per cent 
in 1985/90to 1.45 percent in 1991/95. In contrast, per capita real G D P 
improved marginally in 1985/90 by 0.23 percent but declined by 0.89 
percent in 1991/95( World Bank, 2011; U N E C A, 2012). The observed 
minimal improvement in growth also reflected in sluggish sectoral 
performance. Here agricultural value added (as a proportion of G D P 
 11
improved slightly (1985-1990) to 30.5 percent but reclined thereafter to 
28.9 percent (1991-1995). Similarly the share of manufacturing in G D P 
improved slightly to 12.0 percent (1985- 1990) but fell to 11.6 percent 
(1991- 1993). Again, poses to trade rose and was more pronounced on 
the import side. On the other hand, Africa growth drivers remained 
primary production and export since many depended on the export of 
primary commodities. 
     Consequently critics have argued that adjustment programmers 
placed Africa on a slow-growth path. Undermined efforts to the diversity 
economically and eroded the continent’s industrial base. Furthermore, 
United Nations agencies criticized adjustment programs for their neglect 
of the human dimensions and elements. In fact, by the end of the 
1990s, the international financial institutions started to reconsider their 
approaches (given many countries poor performance under the 
adjustment programs and worsening poverty). Eventually, a joint 
initiative (poverty Reduction Strategy paper) launched by these financial 
institutions (in 1999) set the fight against poverty at the heart of growth 
and development policies. In the same way, the United Nations System 
was setting the millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets at levels 
that balanced ambition with feasibility. However, since the second half 
of the 1990s (following almost two decades of stagnation and decline) 
growth slightly improved in Africa. Table (2.1) shows the comparative 
growth performance of African economies in the recent years.  
 Here, gross domestic product (GDP) is the gross value added (at 
purchasers’ prices) by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
Operationally, it is calculated without deduction for the depreciation of 
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fabricated assets or for the depletion or degradation of natural 
resources. On the other hand, value added is the net output of an 
industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. 
Notably, the industrial origin of value added is determined by 
international standard industrial classification (I S I C. on the other 
hand, gross domestic product average annual growth rate is calculated 
from constant price G D P date in local currency. Again, agricultural 
productivity is the ratio of agricultural value added measured in 2000 
united states dwellers) to the number of worker in agriculture. In fact, 
agricultural productivity is measured by value added includes that of 
forestry and fishing. The living standard of the working poor is the share 
of total employment represented by workers who are members of 
household living in extreme poverty (in percent). Here, household living 
in extreme poverty are identified on the basis of poverty rates computed 
from the international poverty line of1.25 US & PPP per day 2005 prices. 
However, the use of the international poverty line means that figures 
are not necessarily comparable to estimates generated using poverty 
lines. 
   Since the beginning of the twenty- first century, Africa’s impressive 
growth and its economics ability to weather the storm of global financial 
crisis as well as it resumption of growth ( as shown in table 2.1) suggest 
that Africa may be an emerging economics power ( ceteris paribus). In 
fact, most Africa development partners have concluded that the world 
needs a new dynamo which can be Africa. In other words, it is 
anticipated that future growth in the world economy may depend on 
harnessing both the productive potential and the untapped consumer 
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demand of the continent. Again most development organization has 
under lined the potential of Africa as a global growth pole.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH PERFORMANCE AFRICAN DATA 
S/N COUNTIES GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTION 
(GDP) 2009 
GDP AVERAGE 
ANNUA % 
GROWTH 
2001-2009 
AGRIC 
PRODUCTIVITY 
VALUE 
ADDED 
PERWORKING 
(2000$)1990-
92 
AGRIC 
PRODUC
TIVITY 
VALUE 
ADDED 
PERWOR
KING 
(2000$)2
005-07 
WORKING 
POOR %< 
$ 1.25PPP 
1995 
WORKI
NG 
POOR 
%< 
$ 
1.25PP
P 
2005 
WO
RKI
NG 
POO
R 
%<
$ 
1.25
PP 
2010 
1. ALGERIA 
(NA) 
140,577 4.0 1,823 2232 ______ ____ ___
_ 
2. ANGOLA 
(CA) 
69,067 13.1 176 222 _____ ___ ___
_ 
3. BENIN 
(WA) 
6,656 4.0 429 661 ______ 47.0 ___
_ 
4. BOTSWA
NA (SA) 
______ ______ _______ _____ _____ ____ ___
_ 
5. BURKINA
FASO 
(WA) 
8,141 5.4 126 182 71.0 57.0 ___
_ 
6. BURUNDI 
(EA) 
1,325 3.0 117 70 86.0   
7. CAMERO
ON(CA) 
21,837 3.4 409 703 _____ 10.0 ___
_ 
8. CAPEVER
DE(WA) 
_____ ______ ________ ____ _____ ____ ___
_ 
9. CENTRAL 
AFEICA 
REP (CA) 
2,006 0.8 322 404 _____ 62.0 ___ 
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10 CHAD 
(WA) 
6,680 10.4 209 ___ ____ ___ ___ 
11 COMORO
SI(EA) 
_____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ___ ___ 
12 CONGO(C
A) 
8,695 4.0 ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 
13 CONGO 
DEM REP 
(CA) 
10,779 5.2 209 162 ____ ___ ___ 
14 COTE D’ 
IVOIRE 
(WA) 
23,042 0.8 652 875 _____ ___ ___ 
15 DJIBOUTI
(EA) 
____ ____ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ 
16 EGYPT(W
A) 
18,8334 4.9 1826 2758 ____ 2.0 ___
_ 
17 EQUATOR
IAL 
GUINEA 
(CA) 
_____ _______ _______ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
18 ERITREA(
EA) 
1,654 1.3 ______ 118 _____ ___ ___
_ 
19 ETHIOPIA
(EA) 
28,537 8.5 _____ 187 _____ 61.0 ___
_ 
20 GABON 
(CA) 
______ ______ ______ ____ ______ 5.0 ___ 
21 GAMBIA 
(WA) 
_____ ______ ______ _____ ______ 66.0 ___
_ 
22 GHANA(W
A) 
15,619 5.6 352 388 _____ 39.0 ___ 
23 GUINEA(
WA) 
4,103 2.5 156 311 ____ ___ ___ 
24 GUINEA 
BISSAU 
(WA) 
______ ______ ______ ____ _____ ____ ___
_ 
25 KENYA 
(EA) 
30,200 4.4 379 367 _____ 43.0 ___
_ 
26 LESOYA 
(EA) 
_____ ______ ______ ____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
27 LIBERIA 
(WA) 
876 0.0 _____ _____ _____ 84.0 ___
_ 
28 LIBYAN 
ARAD 
(WA)  
-  - - - - - - 
29 MADAGAS
GAR (EA) 
9,052 3.9 210 182 72 ___ ___
_ 
30 MALAWI 4,975 4.9 86 126 _____ ____ ___ 
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(EA) 
31 MALI(WA) 8,996 5.3 405 515 _____ 86.0 ___
_ 
31 MAURHA
NIA(WA) 
3,031 4.7 671 414 ____ ____ ___
_ 
33 MAURHIU
S(EA) 
_______ ________ ________ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
34 MAYOTE 
(EA) 
______ _______ ______ ____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
35 MOROCC
O(NA) 
90.859 5.0 1788 2306 _____ ____ ___ 
36 MOZAMBI
QUE(EA) 
9,790 7.9 117 174 _____ ____ ___
_ 
37 NAMIBIA 
(SA) 
____ _______ _______ _____ 49.0 ____ ___
_ 
38 NIGER(W
A) 
5,384 4.4 242 ____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
39 NIGERIA 
(WA) 
16,8994 6.4 ______ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
40 REUNION
(EA) 
______ ______ _______ _____ _____ ___ ___ 
41 RWANDA 
(EA) 
5,064 6.8 193 215 _____ ____ ___
_ 
42 SAINT 
HELEN 
(WA) 
______ _________ ________ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
43 SAOTOME 
PRINCIPE 
(CA) 
_______ _________ _________ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
44 SENEGAL 13,O59 4.2 251 223 ______ 34.0 ___
_ 
45 SEYCHEU
ES(EA) 
_______ ______ _______ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
46 SIERRA 
LEONE 
(WA) 
1,42 9.5 _________ _____ ______ 53.0 ___
_ 
47 SOMALIA 
(EA) 
______ ________ ________ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
48 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
(SA) 
28,983 4.1 2149 3149 ______ ____ ___
_ 
49 SUDAN(N
A) 
54,77 7.3 526 844 ______ ____ ___
_ 
50 SOUTH 
SUDAN 
(NA) 
________ _______ _______ _____ _____ ____ ___
_ 
51 SWAZILA ______ _______ _______ _____ ______ 79.0 ___ 
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ND(SA) 
52 TANZANI
A(EA) 
21,623 6.8 261 324 _____ ____ ___
_ 
53 TOGO 
(WA) 
2,855 2.5 345 394 _____ 39.0 ___
_ 
54 TUNISIA(
NA) 
39,561 4.9 2,975 3,424 ______ ____ ___
_ 
55 UGANDA(
EA) 
15,736 7.5 175 191 ______ ___ ___
_ 
56 WESTERN 
SAHARA 
(NA)  
________ _______ _______ _____ ______ ____ ___
_ 
57 ZAMBIA 
(EA) 
12,748 5.4 189 227 56.0 65.0 ___
_ 
58 ZIMBABW
E(EA) 
_____ -5.7 271 239 ____ ___ ___
_ 
59 OCEANIA:
AUSTRALI
A 
924,843 3.3 20,676 30,830 0.0 0.0 0.0 
60 ASIA:JAP
AN 
5,067,526 1.1 20,350 41,492 0.0 0.0 0.0 
61 EUROPE: 
BRITAIN 
2,174,530 1.9 21,236 27,450 0.0 0.0 0.0 
62 AMERICA:
UNITED 
STATES 
14,256,300 2.1 20,353 45,285 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Here, growth pole may be defined as an economy that accounts for a 
significant proportion of global economic activity whose growth has 
sufficiently large forward and backward linkages as well as technological 
and knowledge spillovers in so many other economies (other production, 
trade, finance and migration as to have an impact on global growth. 
Indeed, for Africa to be a global growth pole, its economy should be 
large and its growth high and sustained for a reasonable long period.  
       And yet, the size and consistency of growth required for significant 
poverty reduction have not been fully realized. Strictly, Africa on average 
needed to grow at about seven per cent for countries to halve the 
proportion of people living below the poverty line (between 1998 and 
2015). But, for the years 2000 – 2010, average growth (aggregate and 
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per capital) fell short of the required rate in each Africa sub-region as 
shown in table 2.2 (UNECA, 1999: world Bank, 2011: United Nations, 
2012). Unfortunately due to over- dependence on primary commodities, 
growth in Africa (over the past decade) has been non-inclusive and 
volatile. Indisputably, high population growth seriously weakens the link 
between economic growth and poverty of vital public services 
(particularly education and health) by exacerbating the huge pressures 
on public speeding that Africa faces. Therefore, addressing high 
population growth is fundamental to raising Africa’s low human capital 
as well as securing faster poverty reduction. But poverty itself adds to 
population growth because poverty and its determinants tend to 
perpetuate high fertility. Thus, reducing the continent’s high population 
growth may be important to addressing poverty in the region. 
       Regrettably, most Africa countries still rely heavily on extractive 
sector for export (such as solid minerals and fuel) and there sectors 
have only weak connections to the under economy. In other words, they 
lack forward and backward linkages to sectors where the poor are 
employed. 
Notably, high mineral and fuel – commodity prices have driven growth in 
many of the Africa countries that have recorded the fastest growth in 
recent times.  
 
AFRICA REGIONAL GDP GROWTH RATES: AGTUAL VS 
REQUIRED 
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S/N SUBREGIONAL 
AFRICA 
PER CAPITAL 
REQUIRED 
(%) 
PER CAPITAL 
GROWTH 
ACTUAL 
2000-2010 
AGGREGATE 
GROWTH 
REQUIRED 
(%) 
AGGREGATE 
GROWTH 
ACTUAL 
2000 – 
2010( %) 
1 NORTH AFRICA 3.60 3.09 5.60 4.91 
2 WEST AFRICA 4.71 2.66 7.61 5.31 
3 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
3.90 2.15 6.70 4.67 
4 EAST AFRICA 5.40 2.89 8.12 5.72 
5 SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
3.80 2.58 6.20 4.58 
 
However, rural area’s limited access to modern infrastructure (roads, 
electricity and telecommunications network) has also reduced the 
potential contribution of growth. In other words, lacking adequate 
access to physical and social infrastructure might be a major impediment 
to reducing poverty and inequality in the Africa region. 
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3.0 LABOUR MARKET LITERATURE 
Indeed, for the last fifty years, a great deal of knowledge has 
accumulated about labor market in low income countries. Here, a 
polar view of labor markets in developing countries was that such 
market are riddled with imperfections and operate quite distinctly 
from those in high – income countries. Yet, an alternative view 
was that labor markets in low- income countries conform more 
closely to marshalling market than do such markets in high-income 
countries. Now, there appears to be important element of truth in 
both views, although the influence of problems in other markets 
(principally inter temporal markets) on labor arrangement is 
understated in both perspectives (Rosenzweig, 1988). In general, 
household supply labor, employers demand it and this interaction 
along with self employment and household production yields the 
observed employment and wage outcome. However, in low-
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income countries, informal and formal employment usually absorbs 
the entire labor force (especially in rural areas). Yet, in almost all 
countries, there is underutilization of human resources (people 
who want to work can not find as much work as they would like). 
For example, in poorer (rural) areas, this mainly takes the form of 
seasonal underemployment. On the other hand, in urban areas, 
one manifestation is that of the discouraged worker (who has 
given up searching for work). 
       Thus, at any point in time, there is a given number (or pool) 
of unemployed people as well as flows in and out of the 
unemployment pool. Therefore, a person may become 
unemployed for any of the following reasons: 
I. He or she may be a new entrant into the labor force (some one 
looking for work for the first time) or else be a reentrant (some 
one returning to the labor force weeks:  
II. A person may quit a job in order to look for other employment 
and register as unemployed while searching. 
III. The person may be laid off, that is, a suspension with out pay 
lasting or expected to last more than seven consecutive days 
(initiated by the employer) without prejudice to the worker: 
IV. A worker may lose a job to which there is no hope of returning, 
either because of being fired or because the firm closes down 
and this last way of becoming unemployed is referred to as 
involuntary quits (job loss) 
However, these sources of inflow into the pool of unemployment have a 
counterpart in the outflow from the unemployment pool. Essentially, 
three ways of moving out of the pool of unemployment exists:  
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I.  A person may be hired into a new job; 
II.  Some one laid off may be recalled 
III.  The unemployed may stop looking for a job and therefore leave the 
labor force. Although such a person may plan to look for job much 
latter. 
Yet, another way of looking at flows in and out of unemployment is to 
consider the duration of spells of unemployment. Conventionally, a spell 
of unemployment is defined as a period in which an individual remains 
continuously unemployed. In other words, the duration of 
unemployment is the average length of time a person remains 
unemployed. That is, given the unemployment rate, the shorter the 
duration of unemployment (the time the individual is unemployed) the 
larder the flows. Indeed, the duration of unemployment differs across 
groups in the labor force, lengthening particularly with age. Here, spells 
of unemployment are more likely to end in withdrawal from the labor 
force among young males than among older males while this difference 
does not exist between younger and older females. Despite the greater 
movement of young workers among jobs, unemployment, and being out 
of the labor force, a significant part of teenage unemployment is 
accounted for by long term unemployment ( just as it is for older 
workers). In general, open unemployment can be driven by labor supply 
or labor demand. It can reflect a worker’s decision to reject the jobs on 
offer and wait for a better one. It can also be s sign of mistaken 
expectations or can result from policy failures or rigidities that reduce 
labor demand relative to supply. 
      Unemployment is often subdivided by type or causes. Here, 
frictional unemployment results from the normal operation of markets, 
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that is typically of short duration as well as part of the process of 
workers looking for the right jobs and employers for the right workers. 
On the other hand, cyclical unemployment results from fluctuation in 
aggregate demand which is sometimes widespread and severe that is 
usually temporary clearly, such unemployment can result in an increase 
in long-term unemployment if the unemployed find it difficult to re-enter 
the work force as soon as growth resumes. Similarly, structural 
unemployment is associated with economic stagnation, malfunctioning 
labor markets or policy failures. Typically, it is of longer duration and its 
elimination requires not only a recovery of aggregate but the eradication 
of rigid wage and employment practices as well as workers skills up 
grading. Empirically, most reported unemployment rates refer to the 
standard recommended by the international labor organization (World 
Bank, 1995). That is, persons above a specified age who during the 
reference period are without work, currently available for work and 
seeking work. In other words, the unemployed usually account for a 
relatively small percentage of the working – age population. However, 
more comprehensive measures of labor underutilization come closer to 
capturing the true extent of idle labor time. Clearly, such measures 
include discouraged worker and that is, those who are not working and 
would like to( but have given up looking because of lack of opportunities 
yet, another group not counted as unemployed consists of those who 
work less than full – time (not because they choose to but because more 
work is unavailable). In fact, this group may include those who remain 
formally fully employed but who no longer report to work or who have 
been placed on indefinite unpaid leave. And because the “availability of 
work is partly subjective, praise estimates of the size of these groups are 
 23
usually difficult. However, when estimates of discouraged and 
underemployed workers are added to the counted unemployed, the 
measured underutilization of labor might rise significantly. 
      Indeed, a critical question for economic policy is to know when the 
economy is at full employment in other words, should policy makers 
faced with a certain percentage unemployment rate try to sustain 
demand growth above trend to push unemployment down? 
Consequently, the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment 
(u*) or structural rate of unemployment can be thought of in terms of 
the duration and frequency of unemployment (Dom Busch and Fischer, 
1990). Here, the duration of unemployment (average length of time a 
person remains unemployed) depends on cyclical factors as well as 
structural characteristics of the labor market that comprises the 
following. 
(a) The labor market organization (inclusive of the presence or 
absence of employment agencies, youth employment services etc. 
(b) The demographic make up of the labor force; 
(c)    The availability of unemployment benefits. 
Perhaps, a person may quit a job in order to have more time to look for 
a new and better job. This kind of unemployment is often referred to as 
search unemployment. Here, if there no unemployment benefits, an 
unemployed person may accept a job after than to continue looking for 
a better one. On the other hand, the higher unemployment benefits are, 
the less costly is searching compared to continued work. Again, a worker 
who has been laid off typically returns to the original job and does not 
search for another job. In other words, such an individual could not 
expect to find as good a job if he or she search for a new one. 
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Therefore, the best course of action may be to wait to be recalled 
(particularly) if the individual is eligible for unemployment benefits while 
waiting. 
     Critically, the frequency of unemployment is the average number of 
times (per period) that workers become unemployed. Basically, there 
are two determinants of the frequency of unemployment; variability of 
the demand for labor across different firms in the economy and the rate 
at which new worker enter the labor force. Thus, the more rapidly new 
workers enter the labor force (the faster the growth rate of the labor 
force) the higher the natural rate of unemployment. Clearly, the basic 
determinants of the natural rate of unemployment are the four factors 
affecting duration as well as two factors affecting frequency of 
unemployment. However, the factors determining the level of the 
natural rate of unemployment are not immutable. Here, the structure of 
the labor market and the labor force can change. That is, the willingness 
of workers to remain unemployed while looking for (or waiting for) a 
new job can change. In the same way, the variability of the demand for 
labor by differing firms can shift. 
     Regrettably, the costs of unemployment are so obvious to seem 
super fulvous. In fact, the society on the whole loses from 
unemployment because total output is below its potential level. Again, 
the unemployed as individuals suffer both from their income loss while 
unemployed and from the low level of self-esteem that long periods of 
unemployed people stop working, they lose for themselves only the net- 
of tax wage they have been receiving, but society also loses the taxes 
they have been paying. In fact, the unemployed value their leisure at 
the net- of tax wage, and that value is smaller than the value of their 
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marginal product for society as a whole. Therefore, the value of 
increased leisure provides only a partial offset to the Okun’s law 
estimate of the cost of cyclical unemployment. Here, the Okun’s law 
estimate implicitly includes the individuals own loss of income. That is, 
the estimation of the total loss of output to the economy as a whole as a 
result of the reduction of employment. In principle, this loss could be 
distributed among different people in the economy many different ways. 
However, the effects of an increase in unemployment are borne heavily 
by the unemployed themselves. Thus, there is an extra cost to society of 
unemployment that is very difficult to quantify. Critically, the cost arises 
from the uneven distribution of the burden of across the population. 
Unfortunately, unemployment tends to be concentrated among the poor 
and that makes the distribution aspect of unemployment a serious 
matter.  Obviously, this is not what can be easily quantified but should 
not be over looked. Furthermore, the adverse psychological effects of 
unemployment (though not easy to quantify) should not be totally 
ignored.  
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4.0 AFRICAN JOB CHALLENGES 
Indeed, the job challenge facing the African economies is multi-
faceted, ranging from improved aspect of the work people do ( to 
supporting the reallocation of people to better jobs) to creating 
jobs for those who want force grows by about eight million people 
every year. Again, structural and technological changes are 
moving people from rural areas to cities. And in the fifteen years, 
half of the population in African countries will reside in urban areas 
which are the result of a migration that factory or the street 
(World Bank, 2013). Generally, the observed rural- urban shift 
improves individual well-being especially for those who find wage 
employment. However, worker’s share of global income may be 
declining. Perhaps, this may be a pattern attributed in part to 
globalization and technological change. Yet, as the world changes, 
so do jobs. And despite improvement in worker education levels, 
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many firms report that they have difficulty finding the skilled 
workers they seek. Therefore, part time temporary work appears 
to be increasing.  
        Clearly, self – employment and farming represent almost half 
of the jobs in the African countries. Here, the rate of those in self 
employment works in small enterprises with no paid employees. 
But the shares of wage work, forming, and self employment differ 
greatly by gender and across countries. And yet, the non wage 
work represents more than eighty present of women’s 
employment in sub-Saharan Africa. However, jobs are vulnerable 
to economic downturns and much more so in the private than in 
the public sector. In fact, short term crises may wipe out years of 
progress and they may start in a single country and through 
globalization spread over entire regions. For example, the impact 
of the 2008-09 crises varied across African countries. Regrettably, 
across these countries, the young bore the largest brunt. While 
international agreement help define what forms of work are 
unacceptable, in practice, many cases, forced labor is inflicted 
upon minorities or group’s that are discriminated against, such as 
migrants, women and indigenous people. Thus, child labor 
provides another striking example (110,2008a) generally, children 
work for diverse and complex reasons. These range from 
household poverty to the relative, accessibility and affordability of 
schooling and from the preference of families and even children 
regarding work and play to the influence of technological change, 
international trade as well as urbanization. 
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      Conceptually, children engaged in child labor include all 
persons aged between 5 and 17 years who during a specified time 
period were engaged in one or more of the following activities. 
     Hazardous work, worst forms of child labor rather than 
hazardous work; and other form of child labor (depending on age 
of the child and weekly hours worked). Here, the worst forms of 
child labor include any work that jeopardizes the health, safety or 
morals of a child. However, such work is determined to be 
hazardous depending on its specific nature, the demand on 
children in particular industries as well as general working 
conditions. And apart from hazardous work, the worst from of 
child labor include all forms of slavery, bondage, military, 
conscription, trafficking as well as using, procuring or offering 
children for prostitution, pornography or other illicit activities (1l0, 
2008a). In some setting, children in wealthier household may be 
engaged in child labor, if household assets and access to finance, 
land, or other resources generate more demand for work from 
household members. 
     Basically, every generation goes through five transitions; 
learning as adolescents (young adults); beginning to work; taking 
risks that impact health; forming families and exercising active 
citizenship. Yet, when and how these transitions occur vary 
enormously across countries. But the patterns can be predicted. At 
the age of twelve, most children are in school and they start to 
leave school shortly thereafter while almost all are out by the age 
of twenty-four. Notably, in most African countries, children begin 
to work at an early age but most do not work full time until they 
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are least teenagers. Again, young people equally begin to engage 
in risk taking behaviors (such as having sex, smoking, trying 
drugs) which have possible health implications. However, these 
young people start puberty early but from families later. And yet, 
young people gradually begin to make themselves heard outside 
the family as well as to exercise citizenship. Indeed, young people 
need to acquire the right knowledge and skills to become 
productive workers, good parents, and responsible citizens. 
Notably, learning takes place in many environments home, school, 
workplace and community. Generally, by age of twenty four, 
almost all youth may have left school and entered a new stage in 
life some to begin wage work, some to engage in home enterprise, 
some to form house hold and raise families or some doing 
combination of these activities. 
Regrettably, over the past thirty years, the age of leaving school has 
risen in every region in the world except Africa. Here, the main obstacles 
are starting too early, failing to enter the labor market as well as having 
difficulties moving across jobs and up the skill chain. Clearly, the effect 
of these obstacles on skill accumulation, future performance in the labor 
market and economic development are long lasting. Recent evidence 
from most African countries suggest that after leaving school, youth 
spend an average of four years in temporary or intermittent work and 
spells of joblessness before permanently catering stable employment. 
This initial failure in finding a job can lead to persistent joblessness for 
young people (especially in weak economics). In other words, long 
spells of unemployment can discourage youth from remaining in the 
labor force, leading to a higher incidence of youth out of school and 
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work. Thus, being either unemployed or out of school and work force for 
a long time can limit the accumulation of human capital young people 
need to get better integrated into the workplace and finding productive 
employment. Comparatively, youth and adult employment are positively 
correlated. As adult employment rises, youth employment also 
increases. But youth are less likely to be employed compared to older 
men and women. Therefore, what is contributing to the vulnerability of 
youth in the labor market? Basically, there are about four factors that 
are responsible for the observed situation. In some African countries, 
large cohorts of new entrants and higher female participation rates will 
continue to add pressure on the youth labor market. Again, poor access 
to information and credit leads to premature exit from school, 
perpetuating skill mismatches. Also, policy failures have unintended 
consequences on youth employment and widen the gaps between youth 
and adults in the labor market. Similarly, social institutions hinder the 
full participation of many youth (particularly girls) in skill acquisition and 
work. 
       Consequently, a countries level of development, institutional 
strength, endowments, and demography define where the development 
payoff from jobs is greatest. Thus, the jobs agenda in one country will 
be different from that in another country depending on their dominant 
features. And yet, in some countries the jobs challenge is shaped by 
demography and special circumstances affecting particular groups, 
however, the movement of people and jobs implies that jobs 
challenges(while being country specific) also have a global scope. 
Obviously, these processes have implications for living standards and 
productivity at both the sending and receiving ends and they can 
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transform families and entire communities (for better or for worse). 
Therefore, a significant research and data agenda lies ahead. In other 
words, further emphasis is needed on the relationship between jobs and 
movement in and out of poverty; the dynamics of micro and small 
enterprises in the informal sector; over the links between jobs and 
human behaviors as well as norms. Again research on the magnitudes of 
spillovers from jobs could identify good jobs for development tailored to 
country contexts. Another research area should concern the impact of 
jobs on the acquisition of cognitive and non- cognitive skills; and how 
this impact varies depending on the characteristics of the job as well as 
the person who holds it. Again, more solid knowledge on the sequencing 
of the international commitments and domestic policies related to 
services could address the reluctance of African countries to make 
further progress in the direction of liberalization and reap the gains from 
global integration. 
         Clearly, setting policy priorities for jobs need to be based on 
reliable date. Now, given that a large share of the people at work in 
African countries are not wage employment; and that even fever have a 
formal sector job; the measurement of employment is challenging. In 
fact, the paucity of empirical analysis on the employment impact of the 
global crises in African countries and the difficulty of the comparing 
measures of informal employment across countries suggest that data 
quality and availability remain a constraint for policy making. Notable, 
much effort goes into measuring unemployment rates as well as 
measuring them often. But open unemployment is not a very telling 
indicator in countries where a large fraction of the labor force is not 
salaried. Thus, the millennium development goal (M D G) on eradicating 
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poverty lists four indicators to monitor progress toward the employment 
target. And yet, these indicators only partially capture advances in the 
quantity and quality of jobs in Africa. 
     Therefore, today’s challenges for Africa labor statistics can be 
regrouped into three key areas; data gaps, data quality issues, planning, 
co-ordination and communication issues. Table 4.1 present the Africa 
job performance data (World Bank, 2013). Here, the employment by 
work status refers to the share of employment in wage work, self 
employment and farming (in percentages). Notably, the self- employed 
includes employers and non-remunerated family workers outside 
farming. Using world values surrey (1999-2008) persons aged 14 over 
above who answer satisfied with their life at the time of the interview in 
percent of all respondents by work status (www. 
Worldvaluesurveys.org). as shown in the table, minimum wage is the 
lowest a private sector employer can pay a nineteen year old worker 
who has no previous experience in the economy’s most populated city, 
in US $ at 2005 prices. However, the applicable minimum wage can be 
legally erected or agreed upon in collective bargaining agreements. 
Here, when a zero is reported it does not necessarily mean that there is 
no minimum wage in force in the country or economy. For example, 
there may be rates applicable to regular workers but not to apprentices 
(www. doingbusiness.org). 
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TABLE 4.1 COMPARATIVE AFRICAN JOB PERFORMANCE DATA 
S/N COUNTRIES 
(REGIONS) 
WAGE 
EMPLOY-MENT 
(%) 2005-
2010 
SELF 
EMPLOYMENT 
(%) 2005- 2010 
FARMING 
EMPLOYMANT % 
2005- 2010 
LIFE 
SATISF
ACTION 
EMPLOY
ED 
LIFE 
SATISF
ACTIO
N 
UNEMP
LOYED 
MINIMUM 
WAGE 2005 
US $/YEAR 
2007 - 2010 
1 ALGERIA 
(NA) 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ____ ____ 55.4 39.3 1,848 2,4
60 
2 ANGOLA 
(CA) 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ___ 1,296 1,3
08 
3 BENIN(WA 9.4 ____ 46.2 ___ 44.5 _____ _____ ____ 600 732 
4 BOTSWANA 
(SA) 
___
_ 
68.4 ____ 12.3 ____ 19.3 _____ ____ 1,308 1,1
64 
5 BURKINAFA
SO (WA) 
4.4 ____ 7.9 ___ 87.7 ____ 48.7 37.1 672 756 
6 BURUNDI 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ 48 36 
7 CAMEROON
(CA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ___ 504 684 
8 CAPEVERDE 
(WA) 
___ ____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ _____ ___
__ 
9 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
(CA) 
10.
0 
____ 24.5 ___ 65.5 ___ ___ ___ 408 432 
10 CHAD (WA) ___ ____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ 552 780 
11 COMOROS 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ _____ ___
__ 
12 CONGO 
(CA) 
21.
6 
____ 42.3 ___ 36.1 ____ _____ ____ 864 1,2
96 
13 CONGO 9.1 ___ 20.3 ___ 70.6 _____ _____ ____ 180 696 
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DEM REP 
(CA) 
14 COTE 
D’IVOIRE 
(WA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0 0 
15 DJIBOUTI 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ _____ ___
__ 
16 EGYPT 
(WA) 
53.
3 
____ 13.2 ___ 33.5 _____ _____ ____ 276 336 
17 EQUITORIA
L GUINEA 
(CA) 
___
_ 
___ ___ ___ ____ _____ ____ ___ _____ ___
_ 
18 ERITREA 
(EA) 
___
_ 
___ ___ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ 0 0 
19 ETIHIOPIA 
(EA) 
6.0 ___ 11.7 ___ 82.3 _____ 40.2 38.2 0 0 
20 GABON 
(CA) 
55.
8 
____ 23.3 ___ 20.9 ____ _____ ____ 432 516 
21 GAMBIA 
(WA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0 0 
22 GHANA 
(WA) 
18.
5 
____ 25.9 ___ 55.6 _____ 63.3 59.7 252 276 
23 GUINEA 
(WA) 
45.
5 
____ 54.2 ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ 0 0 
24 GUINEAU 
BISSAU 
(WA) 
___ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ 0 0 
25 KENYA 
(EA) 
29.
1 
____ 7.4 ___ 63.5 ____ _____ ____ 924 1,0
68 
26 LESOTHO 
(SA) 
___ ____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ _____ ___
_ 
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27 LIBERIA 
(WA) 
14.
2 
____ 43.8 ___ 42.0 _____ ____ ___ 588 564 
28 LIBYANARA
B J. (NA) 
___
_ 
___ ___ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ ____ ___
_ 
29 MADAGASG
AR(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ 288 420 
30 MALAWI 
(EA) 
10.
2 
____ 7.0 ___ 82.9 ____ ____ ____ 192 252 
31 MALI (WA) 11.
0 
____ 33.0 ___ 56.1 ____ 58.2 53.1 156 150 
32 MAURITANI
A (WA) 
___
_ 
35.6 ____ 42.8  21.6 ____ ___ 876 888 
33 MAURITIUS 
(EA) 
___
_ 
78.8 ____ 15.9 ____ 5.3 _____ ____ 1,188 1,6
92 
34 MAYOTTE 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ___ ____ _____ ____ _____ ___
_ 
35 MOROCO 
(NA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ 36.7 20.0 2,364 2,7
36 
36 MOZAMBIQ
UE (EA) 
12.
9 
8.9 7.3 8.6 79.9 82.5 ___ ___ 732 1,0
32 
37 NAMIBIA 
(SA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ___ 0 0 
38 NIGER 
(WA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ___ 612 636 
39 NIGERIA 
(WA) 
19.
3 
____ 57.7 ___ ____ 23.0 71.4 76.7 0 0 
40 REUNION 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ ____ ___ 
41 RWANDA 
(EA) 
23.
9 
 9.1  67.0  42.2  228 0 
42 SAINTHELE ___ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ _____ ___
 36
N(WA) _ 
43 SAOTOME 
PRINCIP 
(CA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ _____ ___
_ 
44 SENEGAL 
(WA) 
23.
2 
____ 42.5 ___ 34.3 _____ _____ ____ 780 828 
45 SEYCHEUES
(EA) 
___
_ 
___ ___ ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ _____ ___
__ 
46 SIERRA 
LEONE 
(WA) 
9.3 ____ 20.1 ___ 70.6 ____ _____ ____ 636 552 
47 SOMALIA 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___
__ 
48 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
(SA) 
78.
6 
____ 18.5 ___ 2.9 _____ 81.9 63.4 5,472 5,5
56 
49 SUDAN 
(NA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ _____ _____ ____ 780 984 
50 SOUTH 
SUDAN 
(NA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___
_ 
51 SWAZILAN
D(SA) 
59.
3 
____ 30.4 ___ 10.3 ____ ____ ____ 1,080 912 
52 TANZANIA 
(EA) 
 8.0  11.6 ____ 80.4 23.5 22.1 408 648 
53 TOGO 
(WA) 
9.2 ____ ____ 32.5 ____ 58.2 _____ ____ 288 648 
54 TUNISIA 
(NA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ _____ ____ ____ 1,176 1,3
08 
55 UGANDA 
(EA) 
18.
7 
 13.8 ___ 67.5 _____ 49.6 31.2 36 36 
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56 WESTERN 
SAHARA 
(NA) 
___
_ 
___ ___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___
_ 
57 ZAMBIA 
(EA) 
17.
2 
___ 12.6 ___ 70.2 _____ 64.3 56.2 840 624 
58 ZIMBABWE 
(EA) 
___
_ 
____ ____ ___ ____ ____ 25.0 25.1 72 2,0
40 
59 AUSTRALIA
(OCEANIA) 
___
_ 
84.6 ____ 13.6 ___ 1.8 86.9 65.6 13,464 13,
896 
60 JAPAN 
;ASIA 
___
_ 
____ ___ ___ ___ ____ 80.9 70.6 12,108 14,
652 
61 UNITED 
KINGDOM 
(EUROPE) 
87.
8 
____ 11.7 ___ 0.5 ___ 89.8 79.6 16,044 16,
188 
62 UNITED 
STATES 
(AMERICA) 
89.
3 
___ 10.1 ___ 0.6 _____ 85.9 81.0 13,992 13,
488 
 
Predictably, Africa’s employment growth over the nest half decade 
is expected to exceed the global average. Similarly, improvements in the 
business climate in some Africa countries and the drive for Africa 
markets by both the emerging and western countries are expected to 
aerate employment opportunities in the region. However, labor 
productivity are expected to decline over 2014 – 2016 (ILO, 2012). 
Comparatively, labor productivity growth is very low in Africa. Excluding 
North Africa, labor productivity growth desiderated in the aftermath of 
the global crisis, and is expected to decline slightly over the long term. 
This decline is predicated on government’s increased creation of short 
term, low-skilled jobs to diffuse tensions that may arise from high youth 
unemployment rates. In fact youth unemployment is higher in Africa 
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than other continents. Notably, North Africa has by far the highest youth 
unemployment rate (which has hardly budged over the last decade). 
Here, unemployment affect women and youth heavily while the lethargic 
growth in the formal job market leads these most vulnerable groups to 
be overrepresented in the informal sector. Generally, unemployment 
among youths is lower in Africa but employed youths are 
overrepresented among the working poor. For example, in Burundi and 
Liberia, more than eighty five percent of employed youths are working 
poor (United Nations, 2012). For the rest of Africa, the informal Labor 
market provides a cushion (albeit vulnerable) for job-seeking youths and 
women. However, youths of ten find it harder to secure formal work 
than adults (owing to their short work experience and limited 
professional networks). Yet, even when they find work, it terms to be 
characterized by low wages, poor working conditions and few 
opportunities for skills development regrettably, the up short is higher 
working poverty rates for young people than adults in the large majority 
of Central, East, Southern and West African Countries (ILO, 2012).  
 Indeed, the lack of skilful artisans may have worsened the 
problem of unemployment and its attendant negative fallout in Nigeria. 
However, the federal government on its part has initiated a number of 
programmes to encourage skill acquisition. In particular, through the 
National youth service scheme (NYSC) government has introduced a 
scheme known as skills Acquisition and Entrepreneurship Development 
(SAED). Essentially, this scheme was targeted at the corps members to 
help then to be self-reliant. Perhaps, the highpoint of Nigeria’s 
employment creation effort is the launch of YOUEIN (YOUTH 
ENTERPRISE WITH INNOVATION IN NIGERIA).   It is innovative 
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business plan competition aimed at job creation by encouraging and 
supporting aspiring entrepreneurial with the tactical skills and capital 
needed to start or grow a business, such that they can create 
employment for themselves as well as for others in different areas of 
life. Regrettably, the Nigeria job scammers exist because of the nature 
of impurity that exists in the country. In fact, there are law enforcement 
agencies that conspire with criminals to defraud innocent Nigerians. Vet, 
another dangerous trend is the imagination of millions of able men who 
are supposed to channel their physical and mental strength to develop 
their country; only finding succor in riding motorcycles (Okada). In other 
words, it is a shame that in 21st century Nigeria, University graduates 
are riding motorcycles (tricycles) for commercial purposes as means of 
survival. Again, the plight of jobless Nigerian youths are compounded by 
government agencies and dubious job recruitment outfits. Specifically, in 
some states, corrupt government officials have forced desperate job 
seekers to part with money that is either for the purchase of dubious 
employment forms or in the guise of outright bribe. Furthermore, some 
government agencies compel candidates desperate for job to apply 
online while purchasing scratch cards from designated agencies. 
Critically, poor power supply, dearth of infrastructure, poor planning and 
absence of political will are factors that will continue to play a 
debilitating role against job creation in Nigeria.  
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5.0 DRIVING KICTS  
Indeed, advanced knowledge based information and 
communication ethnologies (KICTS) are the hearth of recent social and 
economic transformations in the various regions of the word. In 
otherworld, people, firms and counties use technical knowledge to 
improve their efficiency in the production of goods and services. Thus, 
recent developments in the fields of communications and information 
technology are indeed revolutionary in nature. In fact, these is a 
consensus that the transition to the 21st century will witness a quantum  
leap in the development and exploitation of information technologies, 
with corresponding ramifications for social and economic organization; 
environment; culture; and development of global information 
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infrastructure (Mansell and well, 1998). Notably, the capacity of a 
national (regional) system of innovation for building the capabilities 
required to take advantage of ICTs is a reflection of the nature of the 
leaning economy that exists in Africa countries. Here, learning capacity 
is related not only to the sophisticated use of ICTs to access global 
stocks of knowledge, but to the characteristics of the communication 
process among people involved in the innovation process. 
 Therefore, ICTs should not be regarded as a substitute for human 
skills or tacit knowledge. 
 Nevertheless, the use of ICTs can offer an important 
complementary component of the national information infrastructure 
that is leading to capability building and enhanced learning throughout 
the economy. Thus, there is a general perspective that there is no 
alternative way to become permanently better off besides the one of 
putting learning and knowledge creation at the center of the strategy. 
 Essentially, people, firms, and countries use technical knowledge 
to improve their efficiency in the production of goods and services. 
Sometimes, they cerate that knowledge themselves while at other times, 
they adopt knowledge created by others. Nevertheless, their decision to 
create or adopt takes into account the constraints they face. In other 
words, African countries cannot take advantage of the rest stock global 
knowledge unless they develop the competence to select, absorb, and 
adapt what they find. However, to take best advantage of the 
technology that comes in, and to spread successful practices throughout 
the economy, Africa countries have to adapt that technology to local 
conditions. Critically this should be the focus of government – funded R 
& D (initially in agriculture but increasingly in industry) as manufacturing 
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develops. Furthermore, incentives should be put in place for private 
firms to take on their on R & D (initially in adapting, understanding, and 
refining the technologies that are already using) but eventually morning 
into research in those areas where they are chose to international best 
practice. However, investment in the accumulation of technology and 
skills does not guarantee that strategies for building innovative 
knowledge societies will be effective of coherent. However, investment 
in the accumulation of technology and skills does not guarantee that 
strategies for building innovative knowledge societies’ will be effective or 
coherent. Again, even strategies that are developed with care and 
pursued intensively may become ineffective if priorities in the external 
environment. Thus, if ICT strategies are to be effective, they need to be 
institutionalized and perpetuated. This implies that it is necessary to 
create virtuous circles of positive reinforcement and incentives for the 
participating actors to maintain their commitment. Essentially, these 
processes of reinforcement require the establishment of effective 
coordination mechanisms.  
 Specifically, for the poor African countries knowledge-based 
development is likely to be feasible only if initiatives are taken to 
develop new models justifying investment in their national information 
infrastructures. Thus, the greatest need for these countries is to devise 
models that will enable limited investment in human and technical 
capabilities to have an enduring catalytic effect in addressing priority 
development needs associated with poverty and job creation needs. 
Consequently, there are opportunities for all African countries to make 
the best use of the potential offered by ICTs to support their leading 
development goals. Critically, this applies to the goals of improving the 
 43
quality of life and job creation. However, exploiting these opportunities 
requires reflection on the experience that has already been accumulated 
in the use of ICTs. It also requires reserved commitment to lean from 
each others failures as well as successes. Thus national and regional ICT 
strategies can provide a framework for strengthening the likelihood of 
positive out comes and minimizing the risk of negative outcomes.  
Basically, assembling the tools is only part of the task facing countries as 
they design new or improved national ICT strategies. Strictly, measures 
must be taken to assemble the human capabilities and related 
technologies to make the best use of the new opportunities offered by 
ICT. In many instances, this assembly process will be market led; but to 
achieve certain social objectives and to reduce the extent of exclusion, 
public initiatives will also be needed.  
 Currently, new technologies, globalization and structural 
transformation have brought about remarkable improvements in 
efficiency. Notably, some African countries may have managed to 
narrow the productivity gap with some developed countries in only a few 
decades. And yet, there have failed to catch up and the gap remains 
considerable for all African regions. In fact the nature of work is 
changing as well at the same time technology improvements and greater 
reliance on out souring to African countries is leading to a decline in 
middle – skilled jobs. In fact, technology has allowed production tasks to 
be splintered and therefore performed in different locations. Similarly, 
transnational companies have built integrated value chains and can 
therefore tap into national skill pools around the world. In other words, 
the changing landscape of global production has brought about shifts in 
skills endowments and in the distribution of top talent across African 
 44
countries. However, skills are not one dimensional. Different jobs require 
different combinations of manual skills (needed for physical tasks), 
cognitive skills (needed for mental tasks) as well as social skills (needed 
to interact with others).  Empirically, the distribution of employment by 
occupation can be used to estimate the skill intensity of production. 
Thus as income rise, countries tend to use fewer manual skills in 
production and more no routine cognitive skills. But even for a given 
level of GDP per capita, countries can use non routine skill varying 
degrees.  
 Obliviously technology progress expanse the possibilities for 
emerging and low-income countries to create jobs in higher-skilled 
production activities as well as to link to international value chains in 
services and manufacturing. In otherworld, technological progress 
enables countries to diverge from a linear evolutionary path from 
manual skill intensity to the use of higher order cognitive and social 
skills. Clearly, technology itself is changing the way workers and firms 
connect through their access to much larger (even global) market places 
for employment. Here, some of these market places operate through the 
interment while others use mobile phone technology. Generally, these 
changes are affecting workers in African countries and not just those in 
high – skilled occupations. Table 5.1 presents the Africa population 
(skills) dynamics data (World Bank, 2013). From the table, population 
refers to the number of people living in the territory of a country or 
economy (in millions). The figures are from population censuses and 
demographic estimates as compiled in the world development indicators 
of the World Bank. The working age population refers to the person 
aged 15 to 64 as a fraction of the population (in percent). The 
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participation rate is the share of the working age population that is in 
the labor fore; with the labor force defined as persons who work or are 
unemployed during a reference period (in percent). The unemployment 
rate is the share of the labor force that is unemployed and the 
unemployed is defined as persons who are available to work and are 
actively looking for a job during a reference period (in percent). And 
skills as a constraint refer to the share of firms identifying an 
inadequately skilled work force as a major or very server obstacle to 
business in percent). Here, figures as from enterprise surveys averring 
firms with at leas five employees that is mainly formal as compiled by 
World Bank enterprise surreys (www.enterpriessurveys.org). Productivity 
refers to the total value added per worker in annual CISS at 2005 prices. 
 
TABLE 5.1 COMPARATIVE AFRICAN POPULATION (SKILLS) 
DYNAMICS DATA  
 
A B C D E F G H 
S/N  COUNTRIES 
(REGIONS)  
POPULATION 
(MASONS) 
TOTAL (2010)  
WORKING 
AGH (%) 
TOTAL 
(2010)  
PARTICIP
ATION 
RATE (%) 
TOTAL 
(2010) 
UNEMPLOY
MENT RATE 
(%) TOTAL 
(2010)  
SKILL 
CONSTRA
INT 
TOTAL 
(2010)   
PRDUCVI
TY (US$) 
PERWORK
ER (2010)  
1. ALERIA (NA) 35.5 - - 11.4 - - 
2. ANGOLA (CA) 19.1 - - - 26 - 
3. BEIN (WA) 8.8 - - - 26 - 
4. BOTSWANA 
(SA) 
2.0 59.9 68.5 - 32 - 
5. BURKINA 
FASO (WA) 
16.5 - -  37 - 
6. BURYNDI (EA) 8.4 - - - - - 
7. GAMERODNL 
(CA) 
19.6 - - - 38 - 
8. CAPE VERDE 
(WA) 
- - - - - - 
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9. CENRAL 
AFRICAN (CA) 
4.4 - - - - - 
10. CHAD (WA) 11.2 - - - 53 - 
11. COMOROS 
(EA) 
- - - - - - 
12. CONGO (CA) 4.0 - - - 51 - 
13. CONGO 
DEMREP (CA) 
27 
66.0 - - - 65 - 
14. COTE- 
DIVOTRE (WA) 
19.7 - - - 27 - 
15. DJIBOUTI (EA) 81.1 - - - - - 
16. EGYPT (NA) - - - 8.7 - 6,677 
17. EQUITURIALUI
NBA (CA) 
- - - - - - 
18. RETHREAD 
(EA) 
5.3 - - - - - 
19. ETHIOPIA (EA) 82.9 - - - - - 
20. GABON (CA) 1.5 - - - 43 - 
21. GAMBIA (WA) 1.7 - - - - - 
22. GHANA (WA) 24.4 - - - - - 
23. GUINEA (WA) 10.0 - - - - - 
24. GUINEA (WA) 1.5 - - - - - 
25. KENYA (EA) 40.5 - - - - - 
26. LESOTHO (EA) 2.2  - 25.5 17 - 
27. LIBERIA (WA) 4.0 -  3.7 5 696 
28. LIBYAN ARAB 
(NA) 
- - - - - - 
29. MADAGASCAR 
(CE) 
- - - - 17 - 
30. MALAWI (EA) 14.9 - - - 22 - 
31. MALI (WA) 15.4 - - - 12 - 
32. MAURITANIA 
(WA) 
3.5 52.2 83.1 - - - 
33. MAURITIUS 
(EA) 
1.3 69.9 62.2 7.7 46 15,443 
34. MAYETTA (EA) - - - - - - 
35. MOROCCOL 
(NA) 
32.0 - - 10.0 - 7,741 
36. MZAMBIQUEL(
EA) 
23.4 48.2 91.2 - -  
37. NAMIBIA (SA) 2.3 - - 37.6 - 14,685 
38. NIGER (WA) 15.5 - - - 37 - 
39. NIGERIA (WA) 158.4 - - - - - 
40. REUNIN (EA) - - - - - - 
41. RWANDA (EA) 10.6 - - - - - 
42. SAIAT HELEN 
(WA) 
- - - - - - 
43. SAOTUME/PRI - - - - - - 
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NCERE (CA) 
44. SENECOAL 
(LNA) 
12.4 - - - - - 
45. SEYCHCUES 
(EA) 
- - - - - - 
46. SIERRA ISONE 
(WA) 
5.9 - - - 16 - 
47. SOMALIA (EA) 9.3 - - - - - 
48.. SOUTH 
AFRICA (SA) 
50.0 - - 24.7 - 17,639 
49. SUDAN (NA) 43.6 - - - - - 
50. SOUTHSUDAN 
(ND) 
- - - - - - 
51. SWAZI LAND 
(SA) 
1.2 - - - - - 
52. TANZANIA 
(EA) 
44.8 50.5 78.4 - - - 
53. TOBO (WA) 6.0 - - - 17 - 
54. TUNISIA (NA) 10.5 - - 14.2 - - 
55. UGANDA (EA) 33.4 - - 4.2 - 1057 
56. WESTERN 
SAHARA (NA) 
- - - - - - 
57. ZAMBIA (EA) 12.9 - - - - - 
58. ZIMBAMWE 
(EA) 
12.6 - - - - - 
59. AUSTRALIA 
(OCEANIA) 
22.3 67.6 - 5.2 - 89.305 
60. TAPAN (ASIA) 127.5 66.1 72.6 5.0 - 105.389 
61. UNITED 
KINGDOM 
(EUROPE) 
62.1 66.1 75.5 7.8 - 72.322 
62. UNITED 
STAPES 
(AMERICA) 
309.1 66.3 73.9 9.6 - 100.365 
 
 Traditionally, investment in infrastructure, physical capital and 
education remains the key to economic development. However, the 
information communication technology (ICT) content of investments in 
infrastructure, physical capital and education. Ben\sides providing IT 
education and training for their citizens, governments can therefore 
become sophisticated users of information technology. In other words, 
by developing advanced applications of ICT and by becoming a model 
for the private sector; governments can change the attitudes of workers, 
firms and consumers as well as lower their costs of adopting ICT. In 
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order to support both ICT use and production, African countries need to 
develop human resources and information infrastructure. At one level, 
there is the need to develop basic capabilities though general education 
and broad infrastructure investments. Yet, focused investments in high 
level capabilities are equally important. Essentially, these include the 
training of ICT professionals, investment in specialized information 
infrastructure as well as creation of the advanced technology 
institutions. In fact, such investments will create the foundation for 
building broader capabilities. Notably, the must effective ICT policies are 
those that promote use and production close to use as well as those that 
build national capabilities. Clearly, these policies will work best if 
developed in cooperation with the private sector and if the efforts of 
related agencies are coordinated so that they complement (rather than 
compete) with each other. However, great challenges must be overcome 
if the emerging mobile information society is to be affordable and 
accessible regionally. Otherwise, the digital divide will persist (and wide) 
between African countries that have access to the new technologies and 
those that do not. Regrettably, financial, institutional, political and 
human factors remain the main barriers for African economies to 
emerge. Perhaps, the evolution of e – CASE (electronic commerce, 
administration, society, education) and e-tech (electronic technology) 
can accelerate African development despite her numerous challenges.  
 Indeed, of all the many technologies of our time, progress in 
information and communication technology (ICT) has no doubt had (and 
continues to have) the greatest influence on the global economy, 
making it possible to collect, process, and transmit information at breath 
taking speed and declining cost. This has the tendency of increasing 
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productivity as well as improving quality and efficiency in all types of 
industries and services sectors. Perhaps, must significantly, the ICT 
revolution is leading to a revolution in business practices. Operationally, 
ICT is increasingly associated with the adoption of lawn production and 
distribution practices, including just -in-time (JIT), instancing and total 
quality management (TQM). Critically, these ICT intensive parities 
(which maximize the utilization of physical assets and minimize working 
capital) are spreading throughout the world; and are likely to determine 
how (and how much) African countries will participate in global 
industries. Notably, the far reaching effects of new information 
technology are not limited to industrial production. In fact, all economic 
nativities (including agriculture, mining barking, commerce and 
transportation) are becoming fast, flexible and information intensive. As 
it changes the generation and distribution of knowledge and ideas in all 
fields, existing skills and occupations are being undermined while 
hierarchical organizational structures are being challenged. All in all, 
information and communication technology as shown in figure 5.1 
(Honna, 1995)  
 Indisputably, ICT can benefit African countries in several ways. 
Specifically, it provides greater opportunities to participate in global 
trade and production; provides better access to information; helps 
achieve and maintain international competitiveness; enables more 
efficient public administration and management; as well as making 
possible environmentally friendly development for clarity purpose; a 
detailed relevance of ICT sector to the African economies is identified 
below.  
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FIGURES 5.1 TECHNOLOGY POLICY PRIORITIZATION SCHEME  
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(A) Participating in global trade and production:  
(i) Raising information content of economic activity  
(ii) Fast pace of economic transactions and premium for rapid 
response.  
(iii) Intelligent infrastructure necessary to attract foreign 
investment and alliances.  
(iv) IT enhanced managerial innovations and new business 
practices.  
(v) Exporting tight and increasingly – segmented markets: 
economies of scope and specialization. 
(vi) Exporting fast – growing, highly profitable software and 
information – based services.      
(B) Alleviating information poverty:  
(i) Taping fast – expanding global knowledge.  
(ii) Mobilizing and sharing local information resources.  
(iii) Increasing productivity of scarce managerial and scientific 
resources  
(iv) Empower private sector with public information 
(C) Enhancing competitiveness  
(i) Transforming industries from mass production to lean and 
flexible manufacturing  
(ii) Modernizing infrastructure: enhancing service; reducing 
capital embedding intelligence  
(iii) Opportunities to leapfrog (telecom) and to phase-in IT at 
work cost (PCs) 
(iv) Revolutionizing business and manageable practices  
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(D) Improving public sector management: 
(i) Extending basic services to vast populations  
(ii) Informing public policy and promoting transparency 
(iii) Promoting national consensus, broad  
Participation and social learning  
(E) Promoting  Environmentally friendly development; 
(i) Reducing environmental impact of industrialization and 
urbanization  
(ii) Integrating environmental information into economic 
policy and physical planning  
Definitely, these advantages (it properly adopted) can charge the African 
status of non- inductive growth to the status of inclusive (Job creating) 
growth pattern.  
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6.0 INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS  
Generally institutions are rules, enforcement mecharrisme and 
organizations. Distinct from policies (which are the goals and desired 
outcome) institutions are the rules (including behavioral norms) by 
which agents interact and the organizations that implement rules and 
code of conduct to achieve desired outcomes. More precisely, 
institutions are the rules and organizations. (Informal norms) that 
coordinate human behavior. Essentially, they are for sustainable and 
equitable development. For any institutional environment to promote 
human well-being, it must pick up signals about needs and problems 
(particularly from the fringes). Basically, this involves generating 
information, giving citizens a voice, responding to feedback as well as 
fostering learning. Again, it must balance interests by negotiating 
change and forging agreements as well as avoiding stalemates and 
conflicts. However, when societies and processes are unequal and 
undemocratic, it is more difficult to coordinate diseased interests and 
forge credible commitments. And yet, social and economic development 
sometimes offers opportunities for change in fact, structural changes 
(urbanization, demographic transition, wealth redistribution) unleash 
dynamic forces and opportunities for institutional change while initiatives 
to channel information can serve as a catalyst for change.  
As shown in figure 6.1, institutions are the rule, organizations and 
social norms that facilitate coordination of human action. On the 
informal end, they go from trust and other forms of social capital to 
informal mechanisms and networks for coordination (world ban, 2003). 
In contrast (on the formal end) they include a country’s codified rules 
and laws as well as the procedures and organizations for making, 
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modifying, interpreting and enforcing the rules and laws. Because 
institutions govern behavior, they are social assets (liabilities) and so are 
the elements of social capital such as trust and personal networks. In 
other words, general trustworthiness in a society can be strong either 
because of string personal networks or because of good laws and 
judicial systems that are generally accepted.  
In fact, as societies become more complex, trust in individual (based 
knowledge of character and frequency of interpersonal contacts), is 
supplemented by trust in institutions (rules and organizations) for the 
case of sealing with strangers.  
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FIGURE 6.1 HUMAN BEHAVIOR COORDINATION: SOCIAL 
NORMS (RULES) AND ORGANIZATIONS  
                                                                          
SOCIAL  
CAPITAL  
INFORMAL  
RULES  
E
A
S
Y
 T
O
 C
H
A
N
G
E
                               D
IF
F
IC
U
L
T
 T
O
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
FORMAL  
RULES  
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
TRUST  
 
NETWORKS  
 
SHARED 
VALUES 
 
 
NORMS   
 
 
RELIGION  
 
 
RULES  
 
+  
 
 
 
 
+  
 
 
TRADITIONS  
 
REGULATIONS 
 
 
 
LAWS   
 
 
 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONS  
 
GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES 
 
FIRMS  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY  
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
POLICE  
 
 
COURTS  
  
 
 
TRADITION           MODERN  
INFORMAL                  FORMAL  
 
Notably, institutional reform happens when the actors take 
advantage of opportunities for change and use instruments of change at 
their disposal. Thus, the institutions that mediate social interaction must 
faster both stability and change. Here, a measure of stability and 
predictability in the rules governing society is necessary for the people 
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to have confidence to work together (to challenge each other to improve 
their communities) and to invest in their future. Indeed, in a society 
founded on broader consensus and certain ethical principles, these 
institutions are simultaneously given force and anchored to give 
predictability and confidence. Reveling the framework of information, 
enforcement and competition, policy makers building institutions need to 
assess what is inhibiting market development or leading to certain 
market outcomes. Rather than focusing on specific structures, they need 
to focus on the functions that are missing and hence determine why. 
Once the institutional gap is identified, the appropriate institutional 
design is equally ascertained. To be effective, such an institution must 
be designed so that the incentives of market actors are aligned to 
achieve the desired outcome. Basically, there are four key approaches 
toward institution building that hold across all sectors and countries: 
complement what exists, innovate to identify institutions that work, 
connect communities through information flows and trade as well as 
promoting competition.  
 Obviously institutional reform is not just the preserve of national 
governments. In fact, individual and communities, local entrepreneurs, 
multi national companies and multilateral organizations can build 
institutions, often in partnership with each other. However, national 
governments may initiate reform or may respond to pressures from the 
private sector or from external cutters. Again, in some cases of systemic 
institution building governments have been effective in successfully, 
transporting laws, organizations and agencies. And yet, in some cases, 
systemic reforms did not have the desired outcomes. Unfortunately, 
creating an institutional framework conducive to innovation is not 
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something that can be made through a clear blue print rigidly prepared 
in advance and then closely followed. Rather it is more a search process 
that begins with micro reforms (well designed and conducted) that lead 
progressively to virtuous circles. Notably, conventional economic 
development focuses on endowments; with an appropriate endowment, 
economics grow. On the other hand, those that lack such endowments 
do not grow. As an alternative new, Institutional framework is 
necessarily changed through the implementation of innovation programs 
and policies, therefore, the challenge is to monitor the institutional 
change on a micro level and scale it up. 
 Specifically, African region are known with countries with highly 
dysfunctional institutions and how knowledge endowments. Regrettably, 
Africa is where almost nothing works effectively. Here, interventions and 
policies tend to fail because of interlocking institutional traps: pervasive 
problems with security (strife and Civil Wars), high cost of access to 
ports, and other binding constraints. Again, finding solutions requires 
cutting across several domains and thinking outside the box 
(experimentally and innovatively). However, most policies are likely to 
fail because the institutional environment is so difficult and the 
constraints are so numerous and inter locking (collier, 2007 and world 
bank, 2010), yet, in a dysfunctional environment, what is needed is a 
venture capital perspective on institutional formation: a search for ideas 
in different domains, innovation, and experimentation as well as an 
understanding that most projects will fail while the few that succeed will 
provide a development payoff that counterbalances the failures. In other 
words, governments and development businesses are extremely risk 
averse and as such failure is discouraged and perceived as a mistake 
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while learning by experimenting is alien to the development bureaucracy 
culture. Thus, the required search and experimentation processes 
needed in advanced settings (near the technological frontier) and in the 
bottom billion are strikingly similar.  
 Consequently, a pragmatic agenda for change often implies 
focusing on bottom – up entry points (immediate policy agenda), scaling 
them up to ensure coo9rdination and focused action (medium – term 
policy agenda), and then moving on to major reforms (longer – his 
policy agenda). Here, the art and craft of policy making are to sequence 
the various horizons of a policy agenda to achieve a virtuous circle of 
growth and reforms. Again, a pragmatic agenda is needed to get around 
the institutional rigidities faced by many African economies and to create 
momentum for change by fostering stake holder awareness, gaining 
consensus and strengthening demand for institutional change. Then, it is 
possible to move ahead with concrete, manageable, bottom – up 
approaches that can serve as demonstration projects to advance larger 
agenda. Operationally, framework programs provide an environment for 
micro reforms to continue and scale up. Unlike typical government 
programs or initiatives, framework programs have distinct features. On 
one hand, they start from existing institutions (programs) and by linking 
better performing segments of private (public) sectors; they alleviate 
institutional constraints by allowing the advocates of change to 
institutionalize their agendas. On the other hand, by searching for 
outside – the – box solutions to familiar problems, the institutional 
framework can be reshaped.  
 Indeed, can African countries learn from other’s experience in 
harnessing its heterogeneity and creating new institutions, promoting 
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growth and undertaking reforms? Notably, most African countries have 
many cases of micro reforms of their institutional framework that 
emerge in unexpected settings or proceed in unanticipated ways. Thus, 
various means of scaling up micro reforms into changes in the national 
institutional framework for innovation can be proposed. 
(i) Institutionalizing search networks of leading actors, including 
continuous monitoring of the progress of reform and 
benchmarking to determine what is feasible;  
(ii) Systematically evaluating programs and projects; 
(iii) And initiating an innovation foresight process; 
As shown in figure 6.2, scaling up micro reforms is strategic 
incrementalism: charge proceeds gradually (step by step) but its long – 
term outcomes is dramatic (with each of the above mentioned 
components considered in turn). Clearly, change is driven by individuals 
(champions) who are willing to risk their reputation on the results of 
reform. Evaluation is a management tool that links the impact of 
programs to budget allocation decisions. Strategic pilots should examine 
new organizational models, test their feasibility and harness the unique 
features of the innovation system. Again the fore right process attempts 
to identity potential future opportunities for the economy or society 
arising from innovative science and technology can address society’s key 
challenges. In particular, these have proven useful in defining longer-
term needs as well as helping develop the creative link from which 
innovations emerge. Practically, the process includes several elements:      
(a) A steering group comprising leaders from the three main 
constituent communities (government, academic and business);  
(b) A secretariat to identify the main participants; 
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(c) An organized program of semi-autonomous working groups; 
(d) And an integrative effort. 
Generally, analysis of innovative policy making and policy 
implementation should be based on the following principles of 
institutional change; 
(1) Rely on better-performing segments of existing institutions to 
leverage reform and change; 
(2) Use search networks to link better – performing segments of the 
economy; 
(3) pursue the goal of double transformation; 
(4) Impose top-down measures to free policy space; 
(5) And follow the bootstrapping approach (at once humble and 
ambitions) 
However, the prevailing view of reform starts with the design of a 
blue print for change. That is a blue print with a known outcome. Hence, 
to detect problems and errors, policy makers should constantly monitor 
and benchmark the process of reform and restructuring.  
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FIGURE 6.2 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: STRATEGIC 
INCREMENTALISM ELEMENTS. 
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7.0 ENABLING INFRASTRUCTURES 
Although economic growth will be in balanced, it has been generally 
argued that development can still be inclusive.  However, as economies 
grow from low to high income, production becomes more concentrated 
spatially consequently; some places (cities, coastal areas, connected 
area) are favored by producers.  Therefore, as countries develop, the 
most successful ones may institute policies that make living standards 
of people more uniform across space.  Thus, economic integration and 
its instruments (institutions, infrastructure, and incentives) are the 
ways to get both the immediate benefits of a convergence in living 
standards (World Bank, 2009).  In other words, in places where 
integration is hardest, the policy response should be comprehensive: 
institutions that unite infrastructure that connects and interventions 
that target.  Unfortunately, the observed disparities in incomes and 
living standards are the outcome of a striking attribute of economic 
development (it is unevenness across space).  Therefore, the challenge 
for government is to allow (even encourage) unbalanced economic 
growth as well as ensuring inclusive development. Surely, they can do 
this through economic integration.  That is, by bringing lagging and 
leading places closer in economic terms.  There, the integration can 
best be done by unleashing the market forces of agglomeration, 
migration and specialization (and not by fighting or opposition).  Yet, 
how well markets and government work together determines the 
speed and sustainability of geographic transformations. 
 Generally, infrastructure represents policies and investments that 
are spatially connective and examples include roads, railways, airports 
harbors, as well as communication systems that facilitate the movement 
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of goods, services, people, ideas, locally, nationally and internationally.  
Hence, firms with access to modern telecommunications services, 
reliable electricity supply and efficient transport link standout from firms 
without them.  Operationally, they invest more and their investments are 
more productive.  Yet in most African countries, many firms must cope 
with infrastructure that fails to meet their needs.  However, all types of 
infrastructure (including airports, railways, distribution networks for 
water and natural gas) matter to some firms.  Although building and 
maintaining roads, ports, electricity grids and telecommunications 
networks is expensive, it is no surprise that poor countries in Africa have 
worse infrastructure than other countries of the world.  Therefore, the 
problem of infrastructure provision has its roots in the potential for 
market power that results from economies of scale.  Particularly for poor 
people, there are wide spread challenges in providing affordable access, 
fixing dysfunctional facilities, improving technical quality, increasing 
client responsiveness as well as raising productivity.  Notably, neither 
economic growth nor simply increasing public spending nor coming up 
with technocratic solutions is enough to meet the observed challenge. 
 Therefore, the general question remains: what institutional 
conditions support the emergence of capable, motivated frontline 
providers with clear objectives and adequate resources?  Perhaps, the 
answer may be successful services for poor people emerging from 
institutional relationships in which the actors are accountable to each 
other.  Here, accountability is defined as a relationship among actors 
that has five features: delegation, finance, performance, information 
about performance and enforceability.  In the ideal situation, these 
actors are linked in relationships of power and accountability.  As shown 
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in figure 7.1, citizens exercise voice over politicians while policy makers 
have compacts with organizational providers.  Again, organizations 
manage frontline providers while clients exercise client power through 
interactions with frontline providers (World Bank, 2004).  Operationally, 
weaknesses in any of the relationships (or in the capacity of the actors) 
can result in service failures.  Here, providers can be made directly 
accountable to clients (as in market transactions) by passing decisions 
and powers directly to citizens or communities, which is a short route of 
accountability.  But more typically, the public sector is involved so that 
two key relationships (voice and compacts) make up the main control 
mechanism of the citizen in a long route of accountability.  Yet in either 
case, organizations need to be able to manage frontline providers.  
Thus, the underlying problem in the provision of much infrastructure is 
the combination of two reasonable concerns: customers fear that firms 
will use their market power to overcharge while firms fear that 
governments will use their regulatory power to prevent them from 
covering their costs.  Originally, private firms created much of the 
world’s infrastructure, but the playing out of these fears (combined with 
a prevailing skepticism about markets and private ownership led to 
widespread nationalization of infrastructure in the past. 
 However, under public provision, the problems reemerged in 
different guises and were joined by others.  In this era, infrastructure 
services remained highly politicized and governments frequently kept 
prices below costs.  Here, as long as governments heavily subsidized 
public infrastructure agencies, these agencies could still operate and 
expand. 
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Unfortunately, fiscal pressures and mounting dissatisfaction with public 
services made governments reluctant to go on providing large subsidies.  
These facts (combined) with a change in the prevailing views about 
markets and private sector for the operation of some infrastructure 
service.  While public provision remains important, private participation 
has now spread throughout much of the African countries.  Although 
private provision has often lowered costs and improved services, the 
problems of political economy remain.  Consequently, the amount of 
investment in private infrastructure project in Africa has declined in the 
recent past.  Therefore, addressing these problems requires recognition 
that the performance of infrastructure providers in shaped by their 
investment climate.  In other words, a good investment climate helps 
improve infrastructure.   
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 Competition also has the power to transform infrastructure 
industries by increasing legitimacy and strengthening investor’s property 
rights.  In fact, it pushes firms to become more efficient and cut prices. 
Consequently, it helps assure customers that they are getting a 
reasonable deal.  In turn, this reduces pressure on governments to 
regulate in ways that weaken investors’ property rights.  Here, if 
government can credibly make the commitment to the investors by 
using sound policies (and simultaneously persuade customers that their 
interest are being protected); it will have gone much if the way toward 
creating a good investment climate for infrastructure providers.  In this 
way, the government will be doing much to provide good infrastructure 
services to all firms and to their broader societies.  However, an 
important dimension of pro-poor infrastructure reforms lies in 
government assigning an appropriate role to itself.  Here, the critical role 
of government is to ensure that services are available and delivered to 
poor households.  While this responsibility does not necessarily require 
that the government delivers these services, itself.  It does entail 
responsibility to make policies and write rules (lows or regulations) by 
which the system must operate as well as ensuring that these rules are 
enforced.  In addition to policymaking and regulation, governments 
need to allocate budget resources to support these policies.  In this 
context, the rules of civil society and sub-national governments in public 
resource should be identified. 
 Again, when a government agency delivers a service, the 
regulatory responsibility for the service lies outside that agency, in a 
body with distinct characteristics and responsibilities.  Thus, failure to 
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ensure this separation (which is frequent) usually results in poor 
performance of public service delivery. 
Therefore, where services are publicly delivered, the delivery agency 
should be guaranteed managerial autonomy in its use of resources as 
well as in staffing decisions.  Indeed, poverty reduction can be 
measured by improvements in four dimensions: economic opportunities, 
capabilities, security and empower.  Notably, households will experience 
changes in these dimensions in two main ways. 
(A) Increased consumption that results from growth in households 
incomes, and 
(B) Increased access to and consumption of goods and services that 
are made more affordable by efficiency improvements or 
government actions in support of social equity objectives. 
In general, most poor household depend for their income or private 
sector activities such as the sale of food and cash crops, labor and other 
services.  Yet, these activities are affected by the quantity and quality of 
infrastructure services as well as by the reliability of access to those 
services.  Consequently, interventions to improve infrastructure can play 
a major role in poverty reduction.  Again, the availability of modern 
infrastructure increases the value of the main asset of the poor (labor) 
by reducing the time that households spend on basic subsistence 
activities, the time that women spend on domestic chores, and the time 
lost through ill health. 
Essentially, infrastructure investments have a strongly 
complementary relationship with other physical and human capital in a 
process of balanced growth.  Therefore, investment decisions should be 
based not only on the immediate economic impact of a specific 
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infrastructure investment, but also on its potential impact on overall 
growth.  Usually, analysis of these potential effects is undertaken in the 
context of the evaluation of a country’s growth pattern. 
Essentially, household consumption is influenced by the need for and 
the availability of infrastructure services.  It is equally influenced by the 
affordability of these services as determined by prices charged in 
relation to house hold incomes.  In fact, government can influence those 
prices through a variety of measures that either increase the efficiency 
of service provision (by encouraging competition or greater involvement 
of the private sector) or provide subsidies that reduce prices (generally) 
or reduce them for (specifically) targeted groups.  Figure 7.2 provides 
the conceptual framework that captures these relationships.  Here, the 
first segment of the diagram identifies analyses that may help clarify the 
issues that must be addressed when developing infrastructure 
interventions designed to bring about poverty reduction.  In contrast, 
the second segment sets out the range of options that governments 
may consider in detailing their strategy while the third segment 
discusses practical steps and approaches to get started.  Indeed, it is 
important that policymakers understand how development of various 
types of infrastructure can affect growth and equity dimensions of 
poverty reduction.  Thus, some measurable indicators of infrastructure 
services are suggested: 
(1) Service delivery indicators that measure the quantity, quality, 
reliability, accessibility, and affordability of infrastructure services, 
including education and health (where appropriate). 
(2) Other indicators that (where applicable) measure environmental 
impacts, the level of regional integration, trade and competition. 
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Therefore, on this basis, considering historical performance, realistic 
goals can be established for key sectoral areas for efficient outcome 
and inclusive development. 
 
FIGURE 7.2 ENABLING INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORK: 
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8.0 Policy Reforms (Motivating Incentives)  
Operationally, before using incentives to promote economic 
development in lagging areas, national and sub-national governments 
should try to find out why some areas are being by passed by the 
market. Such questions include:  
(i) Is it because of the low social returns to economic production in 
these places, the low ability to capture these returns or the high 
cost of finance?  
(ii) Have policies actively or inadvertently blocked local economic 
growth?  
Thus, the success of incentives depends on how well the problem is 
diagnosed. Perhaps, starting with area specific natural, human and 
infrastructure endowments, know thy economy should be the motto of 
sub-national governments. In other words, good information can 
promote constructive debate on development options while building 
consensus around a development strategy. Here, if the information and 
subsequent analysis points to specific opportunities for growth; the next 
step will be to identify whether the planed incentives are to subsidize 
capital formation or to promote invasion.  Predictable, if they are to 
attract firms with potential local multipliers, it is important to know 
whether the product lines value agglomeration economies that can 
reduce the power of the incentives. However, for firms in sectors in 
which economies of scale and agglomeration are important for 
production; it is less likely that spatially targeted interventions will 
attract then to lagging areas.  
 And yet, at all stages of development, forcing economic production 
to spread evenly across areas is both allusive and expressive. Generally, 
growth is unbalanced, but it always brings more resources for societies 
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to balance development outcomes strictly, policy makers should identify 
and execute strategies that balance development outcomes across 
arecas by means other than resisting the forces of unbalanced growth. 
However, all discussions of territorial development policies should start 
with spatially blind institutions. Similarly, infrastructure that connects 
lagging areas to markets can help nations integrate. That is, the 
emergence of domestic integration.  In addition to the discussions of 
spatially targeted incentives, the right mix of integration instruments will 
bring the benefits that come from both unbalanced growth and inclusive 
development.  
 While public works and targeted employment programs are 
justified in certain situations, the primary role of government is not to 
directly provide employment. Rather, government is expected to set the 
conditions for job creation by the private sector as well as removing the 
obstacles to the creation of more of the jobs with the highest 
development payoffs (given the circumstance of the country). In deed, 
fundamentals are necessary for growth and are a precondition for strong 
job creation by the private sector. Notably, macroeconomic stability, 
enabling business environment, human capital and rule of law 
(progressive realization of rights) are the key policy fundamentals. 
Again, labor policies need to be adequate for growth to translate into 
jobs. In other words, policies should seek to avoid the distortive 
interventions that stifle labor reallocation and undermine the creation of 
jobs in functional cities as well as global value chains. But polities should 
also ensure voice and social protection (especially for the most 
vulnerable). On the other hand, policy priorities have to be established 
in support of good jobs for development. Operationally, policies should 
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aim at removing the market imperfections as well as institutional failures 
preventing the private sector from creating more of those jobs. Clearly, 
if the constraints cannot be easily singled out or difficult to remove, 
offsetting policies may be considered.  
 New technologies are revolutionizing how people connect with 
jobs. Mobile phones have spread widely and have penetrated low 
income households around Africa. Text messaging, voice and mobile 
applications give jobseekers and employers access to information as well 
as job counseling services that improve resumes and interview skills, 
and establish networks. In particular voice-based services are important 
for illiterate job seekers. The internet also brings together jobseekers 
and employers through inline platforms. While this new phenomenon 
has the potential to create many new jobs and generate substantial new 
wealth; online platforms generally serve people with specialized and 
technical skills. Consequently, this platform may reach few of the most 
inenarrable. However, innovative technology-based approaches are 
transforming the ways in which insurance and other cash benefits are 
provided. Notably, many African countries lack robust systems for 
identifying people (allowing fraud of various kinds) and preventing many 
among the poor from accessing social programs. Also, poor I 
identification hampers efforts to coordinate across government and 
donor sponsored programs as well as leading to duplication of costs. To 
confront this challenge, African countries are expected to more to 
Biometric technology. Here, applications such as mobile phones with 
finger-pint readers that would allow online vindication of identity 
acceptable to service providers are now piloted. Another advantage is 
the back-end part of the social protection systems which allows tracking 
 74
of transactions on a regular basis as well as generation of key indicators 
(reports).  
 Arguably, the management information system (MIS) is even more 
important for complex social insurance programs, especially as 
populations’ age and non communicable diseases become more 
prevalent. In fact, keeping track of work histories allow for a better 
alignment of pension benefits as well as social security contributions. 
Essentially, databases of medical histories support a more efficient 
design of health protocols and payment to health care providers. 
However, information is no longer the sole domain of these 
administering the program. Notably, one of the applications of modern 
technology with the most potential impact is citizen reporting of acts of 
corruption and negligence through social media. Indeed, massive mobile 
phone penetration has been an especially empowering tool.  And despite 
the inherent problems, the future of social protection will inevitably 
include creative way of applying new technology for inclusive 
development purpose.  
 Obviously, policies for jobs need to be based on reliable data and 
rigorous analysis. Given that a large share of the people at work in 
African countries are not wage employees and  that even a larger share 
lacks social security coverage, the  measurement of employment must 
look beyond whatever formal employment data the country gathers. 
Thus, determining which jobs have the greatest payoffs for poverty 
reduction requires linking information on a household’s income or 
consumption with information on the employment of its members. 
Again, understanding which firms create more jobs; or whether labor 
reallocation leads to substantial growth rather than just churning; 
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requires information on the inputs and outputs of very diverse 
production clits (including micro enterprises). In fact, assessing whether 
employment experiences affect trust and willingness to engage in 
society requires information on individual values as well as behaviors. 
Clearly, such information is necessary to tackle an emerging research 
agenda on jobs and development.  
 Indeed, today’s challenges regarding labor statistics can be 
regrouped into three key areas: data gaps; data quality issues; and 
planning/ coordination/ communication issues. Notably, in some African 
countries, labor statistics do not exist at all or are collated only 
sporadically. Even when labor statistics do exist, data quality is a 
concern throughout the statistical production chain (from the use of 
appropriate definitions to questionnaire design; from sampling frames to 
interviewing protocols; and from data entry/coding to 
verification/estimation procedures). Regrettably, planning, coordination 
and communication issues are exacerbated when different institutions 
are responsible for collecting and disseminating the data. Therefore, the 
most urgent prentices are to inevitably include creative way of applying 
new technology for inclusive development purposes.  
 Obviously, policies for jobs need to be based on reliable data and 
rigorous analysis. Given that a large share of the people at work in 
African counties are not wage employees and that even a larger share 
lacks socials security coverage, the measurement of employment must 
look beyond whatever formal employment data the country gather. 
Thus, determining which jobs have the greatest payoffs for poverty 
reduction requires linking information on a household’s income or 
consumption with information on the employment of its members. 
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Again, understanding which firms create more jobs; or whether labor 
reallocation leads to substantial growth rather than just churning; 
requires information on the inputs and outputs f very diverse production 
units (including micro enterprises). In fact assessing whether 
employment experiences standardize the employment modules attaches 
to the household surveys used for poverty analysis and to ensure that 
establishment surveys include informal firms and micro enterprises.  
 Undisputable, education (both basic and tertiary) provides the 
basis for building national competitiveness. In other words, the key to 
sustained growth, competitiveness and economic transformation is a 
progressive up grade of national technological capacity. Thus, greater 
emphasis must be given to improving scientific and technological skills, 
business management as well as other fields that will set the key to 
unhooking African’s productive potential. Basically, this can largely be 
achieved through a radical restructuring of the existing tertiary 
education system via auricular reform, appropriate funding mechanisms 
as well as incentives for emanation and high performance. However, in 
the short and medium term, human resource development policy should 
move to return and retool unemployed school graduates from secondary 
and tertiary educational institutions in order to meet the growing 
demand for other skills on the labor market.  
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9.0 CONCLUSION  
Generally, rapid and sustained growth is viewed as the main 
priority for African countries, as a precondition for continued increases in 
living standards as well as strengthened social cohesion. But 
transformations in living standards, productivity and social cohesion do 
not necessarily happen at the same pace. The recognition of these lags 
and gaps has therefore led to the various qualifiers of growth. However, 
economic growth, living standards and social cohesion can indeed move 
together and they often do. It is therefore jobs that bring these three 
transformations together. In otherworld, all of these transformations are 
related to jobs. In fact, the development process is about some jobs 
becoming better and others disappearing; about people taking jobs and 
changing jobs; and about jobs migrating to other pl aces within and 
across countries. Eventually, this movement transforms the lives of 
families and communities; organization of firms; as well as the norms 
and values of societies. It can also boost productivity and improve living 
standards while affecting cohesiveness of society.  
As a key driver of development, jobs have consequences beyond 
wages and earnings. In fact, stability commuting time, learning and 
advancement, opportunities, entitlements to passion benefits as well as 
other amenities is highly valued by some workers. Indeed, job 
challenges are not the same every where creating more jobs may be a 
universal goal but the types of jobs that can contribute the most to 
development depend on the country context certainly, the level of 
development matters for African countries who are already grappling 
with how for the formal economy can be extended, it is bound to be 
different. Thus, a core set of basic skills (both cognitive and social) is 
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necessary for productive employment; and they cannot just be acquired 
on the job. Without such generic skills, the prospects of improving 
employment opportunities and earnings are thin. Again, skills are critical 
for African countries to more up the value-added ladder; as they can 
ignite innovation; produce the benefits of mutual learning; and have 
lead to jobs creation threshes. 
However, when there is clarity about where the good jobs for 
development are and there is sufficient information to understand what 
can be done to support the creation of those jobs, a targeted investment 
climate may be warranted. In addition to rebuilding and strengthening 
state capacity, a development framework should focus on promoting 
high, sustainable and shared economic growth through diversification 
and transformation. This framework should be expended to steer 
economic and social policies to work in a complementary manner. For 
African reform programs to succeed there must be significant social 
reform and a reduction in socio-economic inequalities. Therefore Africa 
governments must tread carefully to ensure that efforts to reform the 
economy along free market lines do not undermine the important 
responsibility of the government to protect and promote the socio-
economic rights of her citizens. In other words, the challenge for African 
government in the years ahead, is how to build strong, vibrant and 
autonomous organs of civil society through which citizens can influence 
public policy while asserting for their social and economic right. 
Consequently, effective governance of economic development requires a 
capable state that maintain macroeconomic stability as the foundation 
for successful productive development policy as well as implementing 
structural (social) policies to unleash productive capacity for immediate 
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poverty reduction and empowering Africans to realize their full potential 
(within the context of inclusive development strategies). In alliance with 
global development partners, this is the times for action.  
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